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WHEN LESS LIABILITY MAY MEAN MORE PRECAUTION:
THE CASE 0F NANOTECHNOLOGY

David Dana
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ignorance may be bliss, but it is generally bad policy. That may be especially true with
respect to existing and forthcoming products that embody the relatively new, still poorly
understood technology called “nanotechnology.” Nanotechnology products offer the promise
of highly beneficial uses, but also pose uncertain risks of adverse health and environmental
effects. For products embodying nanotechnology, there is a powerful normative case for
adherence to what I will call “the precautionary‐study principle.” The principle requires that the
possible risks from these products would be explored (if in all likelihood not really understood)
before their release to the marketplace. It also would require that possible risks are thereafter
continually studied. Continual study after the release of products into the market is important
because it allows adverse effects to be isolated and understood using improvements in the
background science and real‐world observations and reports from consumers and others who
have been exposed to the products.
A central question, therefore, is how to shift the nanotechnology status quo toward
greater adherence to a precautionary‐study principle. To that end, this Article proposes a
federal legislative regime of limited protections from tort liability for nanotechnology product
manufacturers who engage in pre‐market and post‐market research and monitoring regarding
possible adverse health and environmental effects from their products. The central argument
is: less liability may mean more precaution, and hence, is a good thing.
Nanotechnology is generally defined as technology that incorporates nanomaterials –
engineered, extremely small materials, as small as 1/80,000th the width of a human hair.1
Nanomaterials in current use in products employ common organic elements such as gold, silver,
titanium, and carbon, but nanomaterials function very differently than larger materials made up
of these same elements. Because of their distinctive size‐related functional attributes,
nanomaterials may be very useful in areas ranging from cancer treatment to smoothing
wrinkles. But the size‐related attributes of these materials may translate into significant health
risks. Notably, the extremely small nature of nanomaterials may allow them to pass various
protective barriers in the human body and ultimately lodge in organs (such as the brain or lungs)
where they could do damage. There have been relatively few completed studies, and these
studies address only a few of the many forms of possible nanomaterials, but these studies, while
not uniform in their results, suggests that some nanomaterials may have significant adverse
health and environmental impacts.2
1

Precise definitions of nanotechnology vary but all seem to include the idea of extreme small size –
including one or more dimensions in size less than 100 nanometers – and the fact that the atomic or
molecular material was and is not simply found in its purely natural state but has been the subject of
some imaging, measuring, modeling, and/or manipulation at the atomic or molecular scale. See J.
Clarence Davies, Managing the Effects of Nanotechnology, 2006 Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars 7,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Effectsnanotechfinal.pdf; THE ROYAL SOC’Y & THE ROYAL ACAD. OF
ENG’G, NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES 5 (2004), available at
http://www.nanotec.org.uk/report/Nano%20report%202004%20fin.pdf.
2
See, e.g., Ben Harder, Particles Enter the Nervous System Via The Nose ‐‐ Conduit to the Brain, SCI. NEWS ,
Jan. 24, 2004, at PAGE NUMBER. As Dr. Denison of Environmental Defense has testified, the "surprising
results" in early studies of nanoparticles include that "[t]hey can cross from the lung, when inhaled,
directly into our blood" and these results mean we should not "ignore these behaviors" and should look
further. Dr. Denison also stresses that the research to date "has only been short‐term in nature" and we
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There is no consensus as to whether nanotechnology and nanotechnology products
should be approached within the framework of the precautionary principle. Some
commentators – including representatives of industry ‐‐ have argued that there is an insufficient
basis for the regulation of risks from nanotechnology, and have emphasized the need to secure
the potentially vast commercial benefits of nanotechnology.3 These commentators have
argued, in effect, against a precautionary approach to nanotechnology. In sharp contrast, some
commentators and NGOs have called for a moratorium on the release of nanotechnology
products until product manufacturers can affirmatively demonstrate their safety.4 In effect,
these commentators have called for the application of a strong form of the precautionary
principle to nanotechnology products. In this strong form of the precautionary principle, which
might be called the precautionary‐certification principle, new technologies may not be deployed
in the marketplace unless and until the manufacturer first certifies they are risk‐free or “safe.”5
These two positions are both too extreme. There are sound theoretical reasons to
believe that, absent some commitment to precautionary action, insufficient attention will be
paid to the downsides from nanotechnology products. For social welfare as well as pragmatic
political reasons, however, the precautionary focus with regard to nanotechnology products
should be consistent with a less demanding, more flexible precautionary‐study principle. The
credible risk posed by most nanotechnology products is not qualitatively great enough – and our
scientific abilities to fully evaluate the risks in a reasonable time frame are too limited – to justify
a blanket moratorium approach.
What is most obviously justifiable is greater realization of a precautionary‐study
principle with respect to nanotechnology products. There are many obstacles to achieving that
greater realization. First, current laws and regulations in the United States (as well as other
nations) do not provide a clear basis for requiring precautionary study on the part of
nanotechnology product manufacturers.6 Nor has there been abundant public funding for

"have no chronic toxicity testing . . . ." Environmental and Safety Impacts of Nanotechnology: What
Research is Needed?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of
Richard A. Denison, PhD, Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense).
3
This has been the principal basis for industry arguments against regulation at this time. See Gary
Marchant et al., Nanotechnology Regulation: The United States Approach, in NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN
REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY PAGE WHERE ARTICLE STARTS, 201‐02 (Graeme Hodge ed., 2007).
4
See id..; see also, NanoAction, Principles for the Oversight of Nanotechnologies and Nanomaterials
(2008), http://nanoaction.org/nanoaction/doc/nano‐02‐18‐08.pdf; Friends of the Earth, Nanomaterials,
Sunscreens, and Cosmetics: Small Ingredients Big Risks (2006),
http://www.foeeurope.org/activities/nanotechnology/nanocosmetics.pdf. One very highly–regarded
organization, the United Kingdom’s Royal Society, has, while not endorsing the general moratorium
approach, argued for mandatory regulatory reviews for safety of nanoparticles in products before their
release into the marketplace. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 1 at 84.
5
See Davies, supra note 1, at 19; see Read Porter, Environmental Law Institute 2009 (cannot find original
source for Read Porter).
6
For arguments that current statutory authorities are inadequate for the regulation of nanotechnology by
the federal government, see Davies, supra note [ 1 ] at 18; Michael R. Taylor, Regulating The Products of
Nanotechnology? Does FDA Have The Tools It need?, 2006 Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars PAGE
NUMBER http://nanotechproject.org/file_download/files/PEN5_FDA.pdf
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research regarding nanotechnology’s health and environmental risks.7 Moreover, even if there
were a political consensus in support of new mandatory testing requirements and dramatically
increased public funding, voluntary testing and monitoring by manufacturers would be an
important component of any comprehensive precautionary study approach. Industry actors
have special access to knowledge about emerging technology and product development and
products, and can change and adapt quickly to follow a commercial marketplace that may move
too fast for legislators and regulators and regulatory institutions to understand and react to on
their own with mandatory testing requirements.
The heart of the Article is an exploration of the possible role of common law tort liability
in both encouraging and deterring voluntary, precautionary study of new products generally and
nanotechnology products in particular. A key variable in considering liability’s role as an
incentive or deterrent to testing is the manufacturer’s subjective assessment of the probability
that any injuries from its product would be detected by the injured parties and successfully
attributed to the product absent research by the manufacturer itself on the adverse effects of
the product. Another key variable is the legal standard for tort liability, and specifically how the
applicable standard falls on a spectrum from the imposition of liability on manufacturers only
for known risks on the one hand to the imposition of liability even for risks the manufacturer
could not have reasonably foreseen on the other. The lower the perceived probability of
detection without manufacturer research and the more the applicable liability standard veers
toward requiring actual knowledge of risks on the part of the manufacturer, the more likely it is
that the ex ante threat of liability will lead a manufacturer to choose not to conduct research
into possible adverse effects, either before the product is marketed or once it is on the market.
Consideration of these two variables in the nanotechnology context would tend to suggest that
liability considerations indeed may be discouraging research into possible adverse effects of
nanotechnology products under development and already on the market.
The closest precedent for the regime of limited liability relief that I propose is the
regime of federal preemption of state torts that is afforded manufacturers of certain FDA‐
approved medical devices under federal law. FDA preemption of common law tort claims,
however, is controversial, to say the least. In order to avoid the disadvantages and problems of
the FDA preemption regime, any regime of liability relief for nanotechnology manufacturers
who voluntarily engage in testing needs a number of components that would help ensure
political accountability, scientific integrity, transparency, and a reasonable pool of
compensation for injured people. The scope of preemption of state tort law claims would have
to be specified by federal statute, not agency promulgation or interpretation. Any such
preemption should not include claims based on allegations that a manufacturer violated a tort
duty by acting or failing to act in response to actual knowledge of adverse health or
environmental effects. And there must be vigorous government oversight of both voluntary
7

See The National Nanotechnology Initiative Amendments Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5940 Before the H.
Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 110th Cong. 38 (2008) (statement of Andrew D. Maynard, Chief Science Advisor,
Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars)(explaining that only $12.8
million of the research listed in the 2008 NNI nanotechnology risk research strategy for the United States
was "highly relevant" risk research); Andrew D. Maynard, Nanotechnology; A Research Strategy for
Addressing Risk, 2006 Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars 3,
http://www.nanotechproject.org/file_download/files/PEN3_Risk.pdf (explaining that of the $100 billion
spent on nanotechnology research only $10 million or .1% has been dedicated to "highly relevant risk
research").
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pre‐ market and post‐market testing and monitoring, and the public must have reasonable
access to the key information provided regulators. Finally, in order to prevent drastic denials of
compensation while encouraging voluntary study, all companies would be required to maintain
liability insurance, and companies that engaged in pre‐ and post‐market testing would receive
insurance subsidies in one form or another.8
In voluntary regimes generally, getting initial participation may be difficult due to
uncertainties of costs and benefits of participation. As explained below, moreover, there would
be strong incentives for some manufacturers to join a voluntary testing regime only once a
number of other manufacturers of similar products have joined. Because the recruitment of
initial or early participants may be difficult and would be very helpful in ultimately achieving
broad participation in a voluntary testing regime, special incentives for early joiners may be
warranted.
There are many possible objections to the proposed quid‐pro‐quo voluntary regime, one
important one of which is how can regulators can competently oversee the regime given the
informational asymmetries between industry and the regulators regarding developments in
technology and products containing nanotechnology. In a purely voluntary regime without a
quid‐pro‐quo for industry participation, regulators have little leverage to demand that industry
make key information readily available to them; the quid‐pro‐quo of liability relief would allow
regulators to plausibly demand specific industry commitments of active cooperation and
disclosure. That the tests and monitoring procedures and results would be made available to
the broader public ‐‐ including the scientific and public health communities ‐‐ would provide an
important safeguard against the danger of industry participants' obtaining relief in return for
insufficient efforts on their part.
Another objection is why liability relief would or should be limited nanotechnology, as
opposed to any new (or existing but untested) technology or substance that poses unknown
risks. The reasoning of the Article might support liability relief for other substances and
products for which it is plausible to assume that the fear of generating liability may lead
companies to forego testing and monitoring they otherwise would have undertaken. My
answer is largely pragmatic: the issue of nanotechnology risks and regulation is now a subject of
public discussion and analysis, and nanotechnology products could be a good place to start to
explore the merits of regimes of liability relief as a quid pro quo for voluntary testing. Were
8

To my knowledge, this Article is the first exploration of a voluntary regime of testing and monitoring as a
quid‐pro‐quo for liability relief as a respond to the question of inadequate information and research
regarding nanotechnology. There has been a call for liability protection for the nanotechnology industry,
but that call has focused on the industry’s desirability to avoid litigation and bankruptcies and has not
outlined additional research and/or disclosure responsibilities that would be imposed on industry in
return for liability protection. See George J. Mannina, Jr., Nanotechnology: Don't Delay Liability Risk
Assessments and Solutions, 21 Washington Legal Found 37 (2006) available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/120806lbmannina.pdf. That the fear of liability or liability avoidance may
contribute to an absence of testing or monitoring on the part of companies has been a theme of
commentary regarding conventional chemicals, including toxin or possible toxins. See Wendy E. Wagner,
Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 820‐21 (1997) ("the
manufacturing community appears to believe that safety research regarding latent harms invites, rather
than wards off, litigation. Defense lawyers tout the effectiveness of long‐term product effects as a
defense to litigation, and this advice appears to be followed . . . . ").
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such a regime actually implemented, we could assess how well or not well it worked to advance
overall public welfare, and perhaps then move beyond nanotechnology. Indeed, the category of
regulation I am exploring here ‐‐ liability relief as a quid‐pro‐quo for voluntary pre‐ and post‐
market testing and monitoring ‐‐ may well end up making even more sense in contexts outside
nanotechnology.
II.

FRAMING THE NANOTECHNOLOGY PROBLEM

What exactly is the nanotechnology “problem” regarding human health and
environmental risks? This Part argues that the essence of the problem is what we do not know.
Any comprehensive response to the informational deficit regarding nanotechnology, this Part
argues, should include not just mandatory testing and public funding, but also a voluntary
testing and monitoring component.
A. The Information Deficit
Relatively little is understood about the health, safety and environmental risks posed by
the manufacture, use and disposal of products containing nanotechnology. The lack of
adequate research and hence adequate understanding of the risks is a theme of every major
report regarding nanotechnology. Academic commentators, NGOs, scientific societies,
legislators, and major industry players agree that too little research has or is being done ‐‐ and ,
indeed, that too little is or likely will soon be known about these risks.9
In considering what needs to be known to understand nanotechnology and
nanotechnology products better, it is useful to categorize the kinds of information that is not
known and must be acquired or developed. One could develop a number of different list of
categories, but I suggest these three : (1) information regarding risk assessment and monitoring
metrics, criteria and methods uniquely suited for or tailored to nanotechnology; (2) information
regarding the behavior and associated risks of different categories of nanotechnology and the
significance of different pathways for the different categories of nanotechnology; and (3)
information regarding risks associated with particular products that include nanotechnology.
The first category of information – information regarding nanotechnology risk
assessment metrics, techniques and methods – is the kind of information that is needed for
assessing the risks associated with different types of nanotechnology and different
nanotechnology products. Thus, the incompleteness in category one information is a constraint
on the acquisition and development of category two and three information. Not surprisingly,
therefore, many scientists have focused on the pressing need for investment in the
9

On the general topic of possible risks posed by nanotechnology, and the uncertainties surrounding those
risks, see generally JO ANNE SHATKIN, NANOTECHNOLOGY: HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS ( 2008 ); U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, NANOTECHNOLOGY WHITE PAPER 1 (2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/osa/pdfs/nanotech/epa‐nanotechnology‐whitepaper‐0207.pdf ; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY‐RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY
RESEARCH 26 (2008), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12559.html.; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 1; The
National Nanotechnology Initiative Amendments Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5940 Before the H. Comm.
on Sci. and Tech., 110th Cong. 37‐38 (2008) (statement of Andrew D. Maynard, Chief Science Advisor,
Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars).
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development of what I am calling category one information. For example, a group of prominent
nanotechnology scientists writing in NATURE in 2006 set forth a multi‐decade agenda as to what
methods must be developed for nanotechnology to be responsibly commercialized. This agenda
underscores how much critical category one is not yet in place for assessment of risks, how big
the task is for the development of the necessary methods, and how unlikely it is that this task
will be substantially completed before hundred or thousands of new nanotechnology products
are prepared for and introduced into the commercial marketplace. According to the NATURE
agenda, key research goals should be:
*"Develop and validate methods to evaluate the toxicity of engineered nanomaterials,
within the next 5–15 years.”
*"Develop models for predicting the potential impact of engineered nanomaterials on
the environment and human health, within the next 10 years.”
* "Develop robust systems for evaluating the health and environmental impact of
engineered nanomaterials over their entire life, within the next 5 years.” 10
Similar calls have been made by representatives of public interest NGOS as well as
entities affiliated with industry. The Environmental Defense Fund has argued that “[e]ven
before the research that will allow hazards and exposures to be quantified, a number of more
fundamental needs must be addressed.” because “[w]e currently lack a good understanding of
which specific properties will determine or are otherwise relevant to nanomaterials’ risk
potential.” And “[m]any of the methods, protocols and tools needed to characterize
nanomaterials, or to detect and measure their presence in a variety of settings (e.g., workplace
environment, human body, environmental media) are still in a very early stage of
development.”11 Lux Consulting, a private sector firm that advises nanotechnology companies,
has likewise concluded that there is a great need for “frameworks . . . for evaluating”
nanotechnology materials” and that greater “understanding [of] the basic science of
nanoparticle EHS factors” is needed for “safe nanotech developments.”12
10

See Andrew D. Maynard et al., Safe Handling of Nanotechnology, 444 Nature 267‐69 (2006). See also
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 97 (concluding that “[a] robust national strategic plan is needed
for nanotechnology‐related environmental, health, and safety research that . . . . should focus on research
to support risk assessment and management, should include value‐of‐information considerations, and
should identify . . . Specific research needs for the future in such topics as potential exposures to
engineered nanomaterials, toxicity, toxicokinetics, environmental fate, and standardization of testing.”).
11

See Richard Denison, Environmental Defense, A Proposal to increase Federal Funding of
Nanotechnology Risk Research By $100 Million, April 2005 (“Even before the research that will allow
hazards and exposures to be quantified, a number of more fundamental needs must be addressed. We
currently lack a good understanding of which specific properties will determine or are otherwise relevant
to nanomaterials’ risk potential. Many of the methods, protocols and tools needed to characterize
nanomaterials, or to detect and measure their presence in a variety of settings (e.g., workplace
environment, human body, environmental media) are still in a very early stage of development.”).
12

Statement of Matthew M. Nordan, Lux Consulting, Nanotech Commercialization Has Advanced , but
Government Action to Address Risk Has Not, Sept. 21, 2006.
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The second category of information – information about certain categories of
nanotechnology and certain pathways into the human body (such as facial skin) or environment
for these categories of nanotechnology – has been the subject of sporadic studies and now
some significant, but still relatively nascent, research programs. For example, a number of
studies have been completed on both carbon nanotubes and titanium dioxide.13 The completed
studies so far often suggest inconsistent results or conclusions regarding safety of categories of
nanotechnology, and hence simply underscore the need for more research. 14
Moreover, even if there were more and better category two information, we would
need research at the level of particular nanotechnology products. For one thing, because there
is an incomplete public inventory of nano‐components ion n current products (not to mention
products under development), we do not have reliable knowledge regarding the full range of
categories of nanotechnology that are or soon will be embodied in commercial processes and
products. And even if we had such an inventory, what we think is likely and certainly possible
about nanotechnology is that the same categories of nanotechnology may behave differently
with minor differences in production and formulation. And the distinctive differences in the
environment (human and otherwise) in which particular products are used and disposed of may
mean that there are significantly different risks from products that contain exactly or almost
exactly the same nanotechnology.
How much information, then, has been assembled regarding health and environmental
risks from particular nanotechnology production processes and products in commercial use?
We really do not know, because we do not know how much testing has been completed by
private industry. What is clear is that almost no public information exists regarding product‐
specific risks from nanotechnology products.
Government regulation in the United States and elsewhere has very largely not required
pre‐ or post‐market testing of products containing nanotechnology. There have been and are
initiatives on the part of government agencies – and notably the federal EPA – to encourage
companies to voluntarily provide regulators with the information they possess regarding their
13

One problem is that the studies have so heavily focused on carbon and ignored "broad classes of other
materials already on the market" in products. See Robert F. Service, Priorities Needed for Nano‐Risk
Research and Development, SCIENCE, Vol. 314, Oct. 6, 2006, at 45. There has also been a marked
inattention to possible effect s on the non‐human environment, and the possible second‐order effects on
human beings. See, e.g., Lloyd's Emerging Risks Team Report, RISKS: Nanotechnology Recent
Developments, Risks, an Opportunities (2007), at 3 (explaining that "[i]t is unclear whether nanoparticles
can cause chronic health impacts" and "[t]here is still too little research into the potential negative
impacts of this technology on the environment"); ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 45 (surveying the absence
of studies on ecotoxicology of nanoparticles).
14

See, e.g., Statement of Matthew M. Nordan, Lux Consulting, Nanotech Commercialization Has
Advanced , but Government Action to Address Risk Has Not, Sept. 21, 2006 (noting inconsistent results
regarding nanoparticle toxicity to date, as "[f]or instance, while Günter Oberdörster at Rochester
University found that smaller particles of titanium dioxide (TiO2) are more harmful that large ones, David
Warheit at DuPont found no relationship between size and toxicity; he also found that nanoparticles of
silica (SiO2) and zinc oxide (ZnO) are less harmful than larger ones.").
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products. But, relatively little of the content of those submissions has been made public, and
what has been made public suggests a selective response by industry to the call for voluntary
disclosure to regulators.
We do know that some companies clearly are doing testing on nanotechnology
products. Most notably, DuPont, in conjunction with Environmental Defense, has developed
and publicized a testing protocol and reported on the cases of a few nanotechnology products it
has considered for development.15 But the DuPont initiative is so notable in part because we
have no idea what so many major companies, not to mention smaller companies, are or are not
doing.
One possible response to the insufficiencies in our risk assessment methods and metrics
for nanotechnology, in our understanding of risks from categories of nanotechnology, and in our
knowledge about product‐specific risks, would be a moratorium on the release of new
nanotechnology products – or even the continued marketing of those already on the market –
pending the development of better assessment methods and better actual assessments.
Indeed, in 2007, a broad range of NGOs called for such a moratorium as part of Principles for the
Oversight of Nanotechnologies and Nanomaterials. That group endorsed a precautionary
principle regime which “would include prohibiting the marketing of untested or unsafe uses of
nanomaterials and
requiring product manufacturers and distributors to bear the burden of proof” or, more pithily,
“Simply put, ‘no health and safety data, no market.’”16
A broad‐based moratorium, of course, would deny the public of some nanotechnology
products that may have great utility to consumers and to the public at large. The very large
economic value of current and projected nanotechnology products suggests that there is a great
deal of consumer and other public utility at stake. Some nanotechnology products may have
important medical applications. In any case, there appears to be insufficient political support
for a general moratorium either in the United States or elsewhere. But the information deficit
regarding nanotechnology – in particular the deficit in what I have called category one and two
information – does or should have implications for one’s view how a non‐moratorium approach
to nanotechnology products should be conceived. Specifically, these deficits suggest that any
conclusions drawn from pre‐market‐release testing as to safety must be tentative and should be
openly acknowledged as such, and that a substantial emphasis must be placed on post‐market
release testing, monitoring and disclosure.
Where (as with nanotechnology) there are theoretical reasons for believing that there
may be adverse human or environmental effects from a kind of technology embodied in a
product and there is an acknowledged informational deficit regarding the risk assessment
methods for that technology, pre‐market‐release testing can reveal only so much. Open
acknowledgment of that fact ‐‐ and open embrace of a relatively undemanding or truly realistic
stated goal for pre‐market testing ‐‐ is therefore appropriate. A very demanding stated goal as
to what pre‐market testing must or should show can have two possible, perverse consequences.
15

See ENVTL. DEF.& DUPONT, NANO RISK Framework 11 (2007) available at
http://www.edf.org/documents/6496_Nano%20Risk%20Framework.pdf.
16
See Principles Declaration, available at http://www.icta.org/nanoaction/page.cfm?id=223.

9

If adherence to the goal is taken very seriously, then testing will be very expensive and
prolonged and, even so, may often be deemed inadequate to make the necessary showing for
commercial release. A too‐demanding pre‐market testing standard thus can become the
equivalent of adoption of a moratorium. On the other hand, if there is a demanding standard
but products are readily deemed to have met the standard notwithstanding the limits in what
pre‐market testing can reveal, there may be a tendency on the part of regulators, companies,
and other stakeholders not to advocate for and/or engage in post‐market monitoring and
testing. Indeed, under the FDA registration system for new drugs, which does purportedly
employ a very demanding standard for showings of safety based on pre‐market testing, there
reportedly has been an absence of adequate post‐market monitoring, reporting, testing and
disclosure, notwithstanding FDA’s legal authority to require companies to engage in such post‐
market measures.
The limits in information regarding risk assessment and substantive information
regarding different categories of nanotechnology and different pathways ‐‐ what I call category
1 and 2 information – counsels in favor of post‐market measures in two senses. First, to the
extent that risk assessment and evaluation methods are improving over time, post‐market
assessments allow products to be evaluated using better risk assessment methods than were
available at the time the product was under development and was released into the
marketplace. Second, because pre‐market testing is not entirely reliable in detecting adverse
effects, the only means to detect such effects and prompt further study of them sometimes may
be by means of direct observation of workers, consumers and others who have used or come
into contact with nanotechnology products. The same argument has been forcefully made even
in the context of conventional (not nanotechnology) drugs that have been subject to the pre‐
market FDA testing and approval process involving human clinical trials.17
Post‐market‐release testing is also important for another reason: hundreds of
nanotechnology products are currently on the market that, as far as we know, never underwent
pre‐market testing or underwent testing that may have suggested potential adverse effects. For
this set of products, post‐market monitoring and testing may be the only feasible means for
assessing risks of adverse effects of environmental, health and safety.
A nanotechnology product regime should include substantial, but realistically tentative,
pre‐market testing coupled with post‐market monitoring and testing under conditions of
transparency that allow for public accountability. There are three possible components of such
a regime: mandatory product testing requirements, public funding for testing, and voluntary
commitments on the part of companies to engage in testing and monitoring. These means are
in no way exclusive, and all three may be needed in combination.

B. Three Components of a Precautionary‐Study Approach to Nanotechnology
17

See Taylor, supra note [ 6 ], at 23‐24 ("Even the large‐scale clinical trials used to assess drug safety and
efficacy, which may involve hundreds or even thousands of subjects, are not capable of detecting every
low‐ incidence adverse effect that could occur and be of great public heath significance when the drug is
administered over long periods to millions of people."); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY
IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA'S POSTMARKET DECISION‐MAKING AND OVERSIGHt PROCESS 13 (2006) available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.
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Mandatory Testing and Monitoring Requirements
One approach to achieving pre‐ and post‐market testing of products, clearly, is
mandatory pre‐ and post‐ market release testing. It is at least arguable that current laws in the
United States would not support such testing requirements. As Wendy Wagner and others have
argued, US laws tend to be very precautionary with respect to a limited range of items (such as
certain new drugs) and almost entirely non‐precautionary with respect to everything else.18 As
Terry Davies has suggested, a new law may be needed as a framework for mandatory pre and
post market testing of nanotechnology products.19 It remains to be seen whether interest group
politics are such that we will see either the use of existing authorities to mandate more testing,
or the passage of a new mandatory testing law.20
Even if a new law were enacted, there are reasons to suppose that it might be
underinclusive or inadequate unless mandatory testing were supplemented by voluntary
testing. Nanotechnology is a dynamic arena in which the kinds of nanoparticles and uses for
them, as indentified by industry, may be expected to change quickly over time. Mandatory
testing rules will have to include definitions of the scope of substances or products to be tested
and the substance of the testing. These rules could readily become obsolete as the commercial
marketplace evolves in different directions that regulators do not understand or understand
well. 21 Moreover, even if regulators can keep apace of changes in technology and commercial
interest in emerging technology, it is inherently hard to change mandatory government rules
quickly. Such rules can be expected to evoke opposition from at least some industry actors, and
that opposition may well be enough, coupled with the well‐known phenomena of legislative and
regulatory inertia, to prevent rapid adoption of new rules. Even if new rules are authorized for
implementation, implementation takes time.
Mandatory rules, moreover, almost always require voluntary compliance to be truly
effective. In particular, regulators are not well‐positioned to enforce mandatory post‐market‐
release reporting and disclosure requirements, as they lack direct contact with distributors,
18

See Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HUMAN AND
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 464 (2000) (characterizing U.S. chemical regulation as "at best, a
schizophrenic regulatory program that acts on a certain group of new chemical in a precautionary way,
but otherwise proceeds in a way that is essentially unprecautionary: regulator intervention is typically
correlated directly, rather than inversely, with the available scientific knowledge regarding product
safety.").
19
See Davies, supra note 1, at 18.
20
It is also unclear whether the EU's chemical regulation "REACH" will translate into mandatory testing
requirements, see Diana Bowman & Geert van Calster, Reflecting on REACH: Global Implications of the
European Union's Chemicals Regulation, 4 Nanotechnology L & Bus 375 (2007) (discussing whether a mass
condition for testing will exclude nanotechnology products). See also JOHN S. APPLEGATE, SYNTHESIZING TSCA
AND REACH: PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR CHEMICAL REGULATION REFORM 49‐50, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1183942 ("Having created a demand for information, a regulatory system needs
to supply it. As we have seen, REACH ‐‐ with the advantage of thirty additional years of experience with
chemical regulation in Europe and the US ‐‐ is more urgently focused on information needs than TSCA
was.") .
21
See Taylor, supra note [ 6 ], at 23 ("Companies that are developing new technologies and product
applications always know more about them earlier in the process" than federal regulators).
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vendors, consumers and others who may be the best source of such information. Thus, even in
an ostensibly mandatory regulatory regime, voluntary efforts – cooperation and collaboration
by industry – are important, and hence so are the strength of the incentives for industry to
engage in such voluntary efforts.
Public Funding
The public certainly could fund pre‐and post‐market testing of products containing
nanotechnology components that would help reveal their heath, environmental and safety
effects. There has indeed been a call for increased federal funding of this kind, at least on behalf
of smaller start‐ups in the nanotechnology industry.22 Public funding, however, is unlikely to
adequately fill the information deficits discussed above.
First, the competition for federal research funds is intense. Research regarding the
environmental, health and safety implications of nanotechnology – research directed at what
may be a real health and environmental problem, but is not known to be such – has and likely
will continue to have difficulty attracting funding when legislators and regulators must make
hard choices as to where to allocate funds. There are simply too many known problems or
ailments or crises that could make use of funding. Nanotechnology safety implications is not an
issue that has a singularly motivated and hence powerful interest group behind it, as (for
example) does autism research, and also does not have (yet anyway) a powerful, visceral hook
for press coverage and popular mobilization.
Second, public funding, by definition, cannot address many questions of product safety
without substantial information from and active cooperation of companies that are developing
or have developed products containing nanotechnology. Whether research is funded by
companies or by the public, companies must be willing to make disclosures that may be
sensitive for trade secrets/business competition reasons and that may lead others to question
the safety of the products and whether they have created or will create harm. The promise of
funding alone may well not be enough motivation, as the discussion of liability concerns in Part
III suggests.
Finally, as a normative matter, it would seem inappropriate for the federal government
to fund product‐specific safety testing (category three information). Such testing would seem to
be rightly regarded as part of the costs of the production of the product. Production costs – like
profits from production – presumptively rest with the producer in a market economy. In a
standard model of allocative efficiency, product‐specific subsidies would result in the
overproduction of new nanotechnology products, particularly ones that may entail especially
costly testing. Moreover, any proposal to subsidize testing for smaller companies or start ups
22

See Prepared Statement of Mathew M. Nordan, Lux Research, Nanotech Environmental, Health, and
Safety (EHS) Risks: Action Need, Nov. 17, 2005, at 39 (arguing that because "[s]tart‐ups . . . have much
shorter rime horizons [than large corporations], and thus have financial incentives to bury or disregard
EHS issues" and "Start‐ups are generally the earliest commercial developers of new nanoparticles and also
the parties least likely to be able to afford expensive toxicology studies," then the "only way . . . for
nanotech commercialization to proceed rapidly while ensuring that toxicology studies are performed is for
governments to supply the funds."), Hearing before the Committee on science, House of Rep.,
Environmental and Safety Impacts of Nanotechnology: What Research is Needed?, Nov. 17, 2005, serial
No. 109‐34.
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who cannot readily afford testing costs is likely to skew the marketplace for nanotechnology
product development in favor of such companies. As a historic matter – for example in the FDA
drug approval context ‐‐product‐specific testing has not been publically funded for either small
or large entities, and the drug industry has included collaborations between start ups and larger
companies, perhaps partly as a result. The federal government, however, could conduct or
facilitate some of the actual testing with company funding, in which case smaller companies
could, collectively, perhaps take advantage of economies of scale they otherwise could not
achieve.23
Voluntary Testing
As explained above, mandatory testing requirements and public funding together are
unlikely to result in comprehensive product‐specific research that tracks and keeps pace with
developments within the nanotechnology industry. Voluntary testing and monitoring, at a
minimum, is needed to fill in important holes in what any mandatory requirements cover in
theory or (given highly imperfect information and limited resources on the part of regulators) in
practice. More specifically, what is needed is voluntary testing and monitoring, coupled with
affirmative cooperation by industry with regulators, including cooperation in public disclosure of
testing results. How then can voluntary testing with government oversight and genuine public
disclosure be assured, or at least encouraged?
One conventional answer has been that the threat of common law tort liability will
encourage companies to engage in voluntary testing in order to minimize harm to consumers
and the environment and hence to minimize their potential tort liability. The threat of liability, it
has been supposed, will lead companies to cut off production of dangerous products or recall
ones already on the market, and will prompt full disclosure of the risks associated with products
brought to or left on the market. The view that liability (or the possibility of liability) will
encourage companies to invest in assessing risks from nanotechnology products appears to be
shared both by those that oppose mandatory testing requirements as unduly intrusive or
necessary and those that support tough mandatory testing and certification requirements.
The idea that the threat of liability will encourage voluntary testing and disclosure,
however, presupposes two things that are not always true in all contexts and almost certainly
not true in the context of nanotechnology products. First, this argument assumes a robust
standard for liability whereby alleged tortfeasors are held liable even when they did not actually
have knowledge of a potential hazard or risk or adverse effects or even arguably could have
gained such knowledge only with great difficulty, if at all. Second, this argument seems to
assume that the harms that would form the basis of the tort claims would be apparent to the
victims and that the connections between those harms and their causes could be readily drawn
by the victims and accepted by courts. But as discussed below, the American tort system
largely employs a standard of liability in which the absence of actual knowledge of a risk or
23

As Lux Research has advocated, there is a clearly a role for public funding of category one – framework
and methods – research, as well as a role in supporting basic research that might be considered part of
category two. Such research has sufficiently wide applicability to be regarded a public good or quasi‐
public good, and there is substantial precedent for public funding of public goods or quasi‐public goods
that have significant benefits for industry.
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hazard or adverse effect is extremely helpful in avoiding liability, inasmuch as plaintiffs must
show that the defendant either knew or reasonably should have known of the risk or effect.
Moreover, with respect to many kinds of products, the harms may not become apparent for
many years and may not even occur to victims as related to particular products, and indeed may
be very hard for even the most determined plaintiffs to establish as having been caused by
particular products.
Nanotechnology products, if they do have harmful effects, likely would fall in this
category of products for which adverse effects are hard to isolate and connect to the
production, use or disposal of the products. Consider, for example, the possibility that
nanoparticles in skin creams may have adverse effects. Because most consumers do not even
know which creams contain nanoparticles and which do not, almost no one would ever retain
records as to which nanotechnology‐containing cosmetics he or she used over time. Indeed,
almost no one would retain records of the cosmetics he or she used at all. Moreover, if
nanoparticles in skin creams indeed can permeate skin barriers and affect internal systems in
the body, there might be any number of adverse effects from them. Many of these adverse
effects might relate to conditions or ailments that might have a range of other causes, from
genetics to diet to smoking.24 And these ailments or conditions might surface decades after the
use of the product ended. Asbestos‐based liability has dominated the American tort system in
large part because asbestos exposure creates an easily identifiable, signature disease,
asbestosis, but there is no a priori reason to suppose that nanoparticles in products would
similarly result in signature diseases or conditions.
Moreover, the very defining attribute of nanoparticles – their incredibly small size – may
mean that it will continue to be very hard to detect their presence in the environment.25 As a
result, it is and may well continue to be extremely hard to isolate nanoparticle pathways in the
environment and prove that nanoparticles via these pathways caused human health effects or
other harms that might be the basis for liability. The closest analogy would be endocrine
disrupting chemicals, which may have some toxic effects but are pervasive in small quantities in
the environment. Although much has been made of the possibility of tort liability related to
endocrine disrupters, that liability in fact has not been imposed, perhaps because of the
difficulty of establishing particular concentrations and particular pathways into the human body
(or given the particularity of private tort, the particular human bodies of plaintiffs).26 The
possibility of environmental tort liability based on nanoparticle exposure may be even more
uncertain, given nanoparticles' small size and elusive nature, even assuming arguendo that
nanoparticles in fact can and will cause human health or other harms.
24

See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes towards a New Theory of Justice and
Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121‐22 (1997) (arguing that in toxic torts generally "in most
instances, the adverse health effects for which plaintiffs seek compensation are also found in others who
have not been exposed to the substance or product in question. Because this 'background' rate exists, it
is impossible to tell whether any individual plaintiff's injury is attributable to the product . . . .").
25
See Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1345 (2008) (overviewing the
risks from nanotechnology and noting that "[e]xacerbating the challenge of nanotechnology risks is that
there currently is very limited capability to detect or measure nanoparticles . . . .").
26
For a review of the current state of the litigation and the defense bar's positions, see generally Bruce J.
Berger & Michael L. Junk, Endocrine Disrupters: The Potential Cloud of Manufacturer Toxic Tort Liability,
74 DEF. COUNSEL J., 106 (2007). On the difficulties of prevailing in environmental tort actions, see generally
Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1993); see Berger, supra note 24, at 2138.
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III. MODELLING MANUFACTURER DECISIONMAKING
This Part develops a model that illustrates how the threat of liability may lead
nanotechnology producers not to test products, and how limits on liability might produce more
testing.
One way to think about the decisions of nanotechnology companies under the current
tort system is to imagine how a particular nanotechnology product manufacturer (“the
company”) might evaluate the decision whether to invest in researching any adverse health
effects of a product while it is under development and after its introduction to the market.
Imagine that the product is a cosmetic such a wrinkle cream, that it contains a form of
nanotechnology for which there is almost no or no existing research, and that is not, to the
company’s knowledge, a known component of any other product under development or on the
market.
A. Assumptions
This model assumes that any assessment of the product’s possible adverse effects
would take significant time, and that any reasonably reliable conclusions regarding what can be
gleaned about adverse effects cannot be made until the assessment is complete.
The model also assumes that the company believes it has some reasonably reliable sense as to
how long the product, absent safety issues, would have a “run” on the market before it likely
will be considered stale or obsolete and the company would introduce a new, differently‐
composed product to take its place.
In addition, the company believes it has some reasonably reliable sense of how well the
product will sell at different times during this run. That a company would have such beliefs
would seem essential for the company to even consider making an investment in product
development and marketing at all.27
The model contains three distinct time periods, which contain two distinct decision
points for the company. At T0, the product is under development. T0 is the company’s first
decision point, because any premarket testing for the product would have to begin then, so as
to produce results by the time the product is scheduled for market release (T1). Period One is
the time between T0 to T1.
At T1, the time of the product’s release into the marketplace, the company has its
second decision point. At that time, the company must decide whether to undertake post‐
market‐release testing of the product, the results of which would not be available until T2. By
T2, the product would have been on the market some time but still would have a significant
amount of time left in its anticipated market run. Period Two is the time between T1 and T2.

27

Somewhat unrealistically, in the interest of simplicity, the model will assume that the company does
not update or change its projections of how long the product will have a run in the market and how well it
will sell once the product enters the marketplace.
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After T2, the company has no further decision points. Unless pulled from the market at
T2, the product will remain on the market until it has finished its anticipated market run and is
obsolete. T3 is the time at which the product has had had its full anticipated market “run”: the
company will introduce a next generation product at that time to take its place. Period Three is
the time between T2 and T3.
B. Variables
Damages (D) and Standard of Liability (S)
The company realizes that, if the product causes adverse health effects and those health
effects are linked to the product, the company might be incur substantial liability based on sales
of the products during Periods Two and Three. As a baseline for estimating its liability exposure,
the company might estimate the damages (in monetary terms) consumers would incur as a
result of the product, assuming very adverse effects for a significant fraction of consumers of
the product. They might also include an estimate of environment damages as a result of the
manufacture and disposal of the product during those two periods. D is the damages
attributable to the product.
Figure One depicts these damages estimates on the part of the company. Time is the
variable on the x axis below. The variable on the y axis are total damages incurred up until time
T. DT2‐ represents total damages incurred during Period 2. DT3 represents total damages
incurred during both Periods Two and Three. The upward slope of the line on the figure reflects
the fact that as time passes, more people purchase and use the product, and as more people
purchase and use the product, the number of potentially harmed people increases. As that
number increases, total damages increases. For products with rapid growth in sales over time,
we would expect a shaper upward slope than for products that maintain more or less even sales
over
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time.

Actual damages – even damages clearly attributable to a product – do not necessarily
translate into a liability to pay damages under tort law. There are several different liability
standards for manufacturer liability, ranging, in effect from liability only for sale and distribution
of products known to be harmful to negligence to genuine strict liability. Depending on the
applicable standard, a manufacturer might always or sometimes or virtually never be held liable
for damages attributable to its product. S will signify the applicable standard for liability.
The two relevant causes of action in tort law for producers of a nanotechnology
cosmetic would be a cause of action for defective product design and a cause of action for
failure to warn of risks associated with the product. With respect to both such causes of action,
three key points in time according to both the case law and commentary are (1) the time the
product first enters the market, (2) the time the product is sold to the particular plaintiff, and (3)
the time at trial. A central debate in tort law has concerned the question of when, if ever,
should a manufacturer be held liable for product risks that the manufacturer did not know
about and perhaps could not even have known about at the time of the sale of the product to
the plaintiff(s). Arguments rooted in efficiency and fairness have been invoked to support and
defend against manufacturer liability for failing to warn of, or otherwise address, unknown risks.
One position that some courts and commentators have sometimes articulated is that a
manufacturer is or should be liable for harms that at trial can be shown to have been caused by
the product even if the manufacturer did not know or could not have reasonably foreseen that
the product would cause such harm when the product was first manufactured and released to
the market or when it was sold to the particular plaintiff. This approach is sometimes described
as hindsight liability or genuine strict liability, and it effectively removes any defense based on
the absence of or limit in scientific evidence regarding causation prior to the time of trial.28
28

See Beshada v. Johns‐Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982) (apparently
embracing hindsight liability in the asbestos context). See also Omri Ben Shahar, Should Products Liability
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At the other side of the spectrum from genuine strict liability is liability that requires a
showing of actual knowledge on the part of the manufacturer of the harmful effects of the
product at the time the product was sold to the particular plaintiff. Although actual knowledge
has indeed been alleged in many of the best‐known mass products liability cases, it is not clear
that any court has completely embraced an actual knowledge requirement in products liability
cases. The state tort statutes in some states establish a strong form of the so‐called “state of
the art” defense; such statutes could be read to mean that scientific information or evidence
developed after a product is introduced into the market cannot be used against the
manufacturer in establishing liability. However, these statutes presumably were drafted with
mechanical devices in mind (e.g. lawnmowers that turn out to malfunction), and have not been
construed to mean that a manufacturer has absolutely no obligation to ignore developments in
scientific evidence regarding drugs, chemicals or similar products after the product first enters
the market, even if the market was tested to the highest industry standards prior to it being first
introduced into the market.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts articulates what is probably the standard that most
courts in the United States now endorse. Under this reasonable forseeability or “should have
known” standard, manufacturers can be held liable if they should have known of the harm the
product could create when they sold it to the plaintiff without an appropriate warning. Lack of
actual knowledge is not a defense, but neither can the plaintiff simply hold the manufacturers
liable for risks and harms that the manufacturer could not have known when the products were
sold to the plaintiffs.29 The Restatement approach is very similar to that followed in European
and Japanese law.30
The reasonable forseeability/should have known standard is, of course, a kind of
negligence standard. Indeed, citing the Restatement and similar authorities, some
commentators have concluded that American products liability torts, although still sometimes
labeled a strict liability domain, is squarely within the domain of negligence.31 And like all
Be based on Hindsight?, 14 J. L. ECON. ORG. 325 (1998) (reviewing the state of the law and then modeling
corporate research incentives under hindsight liability).
29
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998). Under this standard, lack of
actual knowledge is not a defense, but neither can the plaintiff simply hold the manufacturers liable for
risks and harms that the manufacturer could not have known when the products were sold to the
plaintiffs. With respect to product testing, the Restatement provides that "a seller bears responsibility to
perform reasonable testing reasonable testing prior to marketing a product and to discover risk and risk
avoidance measures such testing would reveal. A seller is charged with knowledge of what reasonable
testing would reveal." Restatement (Third) Sec. 2 cmt. m ??? CANNOT FIND COMMENT M. As Mark
Geistfeld has explained, because proving what a reasonable research program would reveal is an
"extraordinarily demanding" standard, the Restatement (Third) standard "effectively immunizes" the
manufacturer even from liability for many knowable risks. MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 152‐53 (2006).
30
The Restatement approach is very similar to that followed in European and Japanese law. See Jane
Stapleton, PRODUCT LIABILITY 50‐51 (1994). The central legal development limiting liability in Europe was
the EEC Directive (1985/374/EEC). See id at 49.
31
See Geistfeld, supra note at 248 ("Despite the 'strict liability' rhetoric . . . this has overwhelmingly
remained the majority view: the liability of manufacturers for design conditions . . . is . . . fault‐based."); G
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GEORGIA L
REV 601, 625‐27 (1992).
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negligence standards, the reasonable forseeability/should have known standard used for
products is flexible and imprecise, and subject to much‐more or much‐less defendant‐friendly
interpretations and applications. Indeed, there probably are few cases in which one could not
plausibly argue opposite positions under this standard‐‐ that a manufacturer reasonably could
not have foreseen an unknown product risk, or that a manufacturer reasonably should have
foreseen the risk and engaged in more testing and product re‐design or warned consumers of
the risk. Everything depends on the conception of “reasonableness” one employs.
For the company facing potential liability, it might be logical for them to think of
standard of liability as a spectrum variable, with proof of actual knowledge required on one end,
a range of possible formulations of “should have known” in the middle, and hindsight/genuine
strict liability at the other end. S will have a value of 1 at the farthest right/ hindsight liability
end of the spectrum, which means that the company will be legally responsible for 100 percent
of the damages its products cause. At the “actual knowledge required” end of the spectrum, S
will have a value of 0, which means that the company will not be legally responsible for any
damages its products cause, at least assuming the company will not market or continue to
market the product without warning once its has actual knowledge of harm. The magnitude of S
increases from left to right as “should have known” is applied as imposing an increasingly
demanding duty on the manufacturer to find out about possible risks and mitigate or avoid
them and/or warn of them. In the middle of the spectrum, where S = .5, there is a 50%
possibility that the court would conclude the manufacturer should have known , which in
expected value terms, means that, ex ante, the manufacturer’s expected costs would be 50% of
the damages its products actually cause.
For the company, there could be two relevant Ss. ST2 is the standard of liability
applicable to Period Two consumers who sue after the company finishes its post‐market testing
and pulls the product at T2. ST3 is the standard of liability applied to Period Two and Three
consumers at T3, after independent research shows that the product, which by then will have
finished its market run, is harmful. Under current tort law, the applicable standard of liability is
formally the same whether the manufacturer removes the product voluntarily based on its own
testing and monitoring before the end of the product’s anticipated market run or whether the
products completes its market run and then independent non‐company research ties the
product to injuries of consumers and others (at or after T3).
LT2, the total liability for the company at Time T2, would thus be (DT2)(ST2), again
assuming the company finds adverse effects and pulls the product from the market. LT3, the
total liability for the company at T3 or after, would be (DT3) (ST3), assuming that non‐company
research at T3 or later has shown that the product caused adverse effects during Periods Two
and Three. One might generally assume that LT3 will be greater than LT2 because more
consumers are exposed as of T3 than as of T2. If neither the company nor entities outside the
company detect and establish the link between the product and injuries to consumers and
others, however, there will be no liability whatever for the company at either T2 or T3 or after.
Probability of Detection/Attribution (P) and Research Costs (R)
The model assumes that the company believes that, absent its own independent
research into the possible links between the product and adverse effects, there is a zero
possibility that the product will be linked to adverse effects prior to the end of Period Three.
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For products whose potential adverse effects, if any, likely would not be obvious for years and
would even then not be obviously linked to the product but instead could well be attributed to
other causes or unknown causes, this would be a reasonable belief.
The company believes that there is some probability that, absent any research or
monitoring for adverse effects on its part, the product could be linked to adverse effects by
Time T3 or at some time thereafter. We will call that probability PT3. The company’s estimate of
the magnitude of PT3 (and the actual PT3) would depend on a number of factors. One of these
would be any ingredient or component disclosure and labeling requirements, if any, for the
product: the less those requirements are, the less likely it is that a link between adverse effects
and product use could be drawn.
A second and crucial factor would be the extent of non‐company investment in research
that could shed light on the effects of nanotechnology generally, nanotechnology in cosmetics,
and nanotechnology of similar or the same composition as that found in the company’s
products. Public and academic research investments might have the biggest influence on the
estimate, because the products of such research investments would be most likely to be widely
disseminated and could be used as a basis for ultimately assessing – or at least raising the
question of ‐‐ the effects of the company’s product. Because nanotechnology research
anywhere in the world might affect PT3, public and academic investments levels throughout the
world, and not just in the company’s home country, would be relevant. The relevance of other
companies' research would depend in substantial part on how likely it is that it would be shared
with the public.
The legal standard for proof for admission of scientific evidence regarding causation of
harm would also be relevant. The more demanding the standard for the admissibility of such
evidence is, the more difficult it would be for plaintiffs at T3 or later to locate and/or generate
evidence that would allow them to survive summary judgment in a tort lawsuit against the
company. If, for example, the courts limit their vision of reliable and hence admissible evidence
of causation of human harm to peer‐reviewed, human‐subject clinical or epidemiological
studies, then the company’s estimate of PT3 may be quite low, even if there is or is likely to be
significant public investment in animal studies and other laboratory explorations of the possible
toxic dimensions of nanotechnology. The overall attitude of the United States courts at the
state and federal level in the last few decades has veered toward restrictiveness as to what
kinds of causation evidence is sufficiently reliable to warrant admission, so one relevant
question for the company would be the likelihood that that trend would continue.
As noted, there are two possible research efforts the company could undertake – one
during pre‐market Period One, culminating at T1, and one during post‐market period Two,
culminating at T2. We will call the direct cost of the Period One research efforts R1, and the
direct costs of the Period Two research efforts R2.
The company recognizes there is some probability that the pre‐market, Period One
research effort would detect adverse health effects, in which case the company would cancel
the planned release of the product into the marketplace. We will call that probability PT1. The
company also realizes that there is some probability that the post‐market research efforts would
detect adverse health effects, in which case the product would be pulled from the marketplace
at T2. We will call that probability PT2.
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One question is whether the company would assume that PT2 is greater when pre‐
market testing has been done and adverse effects are not found than when no pre‐market
testing has been done. On the one hand, one might suppose that the finding of no adverse
effects in pre‐market research would or could give rise to a greater confidence level that the
product in fact is not harmful and hence a greater confidence that post‐market research will not
identify harmful effects. On the other hand, one might suppose that the more familiarity the
company has with the behavior of the nanotechnology component of the product, the more
effective it could be in structuring a post‐market‐release testing program that could find any
adverse effects from the product. For example, if pre‐market testing showed that certain
nanoparticles tend to follow certain pathways, that would help the company know where to
look, in the post‐market‐release period, for potentially problematic accumulations in consumers
and the environment. These two effects – one tending to suggest a lower PT2, the other
suggesting a higher PT2, as a result of pre‐market testing having been done – might well cancel
out.32
C. Comparing The Expected Costs of the Four Options
The first question for the company, presumably, would be what are the expected
liability costs if the company does nothing – that is, invests in neither the pre‐market, Period
One research effort or the post‐market, Period Two research effort? If the company does
nothing, it faces a possible liability of LT3, but it will be burdened with LT3 only if independent,
non‐company research identifies adverse effects and links them to the company’s product.
Thus, the expected liability costs if the company does nothing are (PT3)(LT3). For the company,
therefore, the relevant questions boil down to:


Would conducting the pre‐market research effort in Period One result in lower expected
costs than (PT3)(LT3)?



Would conducting the post‐market research effort in Period Two result in lower
expected costs than (PT3)(LT3)?



Would conducting both research efforts result in lower expected costs than (PT3)(LT3)?



If doing nothing (forgoing both research efforts) is not the expected‐cost‐minimizing
choice, which choice is: conducting only the pre‐market research effort in Period One,
conducting only the post‐market research effort in Period Two, or conducting both?

Period One, Pre‐Market Investment

32

The model also assumes that the company’s estimate of PT2 and PT3 are unconnected or independent
variables. In the absence of a public disclosure requirement on the part of the company, that may be a
reasonable assumption. However, if the company were required to disclose the research it conducted in
Period One or Two, then, even if the company’s conclusion were that the product is safe, the release of
the research would increase the information available about the product and in that way might guide
independent research and result in a higher PT3.
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If the company invests in research during Period One, and finds that the product is
harmful, the product will not be marketed and hence total liability will be zero, but the company
will bear the direct research cost of R1. However, there presumably will be a relatively low
expected probability of finding that the product is harmful by the end of the pre‐marketing
research: PT1 is presumably well below .5. If no harm is found, then the company could bear
liability if independent research links the product to harmful effects by T3 or later. Thus, the
expected costs of doing the pre‐market research project is R1 + (1‐P T1)(P T3)(L T3). Undertaking
the pre‐market research is worthwhile if R1 + (1‐P T1)(P T3)(L T3) < (PT3)(LT3).
Period Two, Post‐Market Investment
Now let us assume that the company chooses to skip the pre‐market research
investment. If the product does go to market, then the research during Period Two could detect
harm and result in the product being removed from the market at the end of Period Two, that is,
at T2. The potential benefit for the company under this scenario is avoidance of the additional
liability that otherwise might be imposed as a result of exposures that would take place during
Period Three. If the Period Two research detects harmful effects, and the company pulls the
product, the company will be liable only for LT2. If the research is conducted but does not
detect harmful effects but independent research then links the product to adverse effects after
the product has run its market course, then the company will be liable for LT3. Hence, the
company’s total expected costs if it conducts only the Period Two, post‐market research are: R2
+ (PT2)(LT2) + (1‐PT2)(PT3)(LT3). It would make sense for the company to proceed with the Period
Two research if R2 + (PT2)(LT2) + (1‐PT2)(PT3)(LT3) < (PT3)(LT3).
Combining Pre‐ and Post‐Market Research
Another option for the company is to commit to undertake both pre‐market, Period One
and (assuming the product goes to market after pre‐market testing) post‐market, Period Two
research. The cost of pre‐market research itself – R1 – remains the same whether or not post‐
market research is to be undertaken. If harm is detected and the product is never released to
market, there will be (by definition) no post‐market costs. If no harm is detected during the pre‐
market research and the product is released to the market, there is the possibility that post‐
market research will detect harm and the product then will be pulled from the market. There is
also the possibility that, if post‐market testing does not detect harm and the product remains on
the market, independent research will later detect harm. Either way, the company bears R2, the
direct cost of post‐market testing. Thus, the expected costs of the pre‐and post‐market
research option are R1 + (1‐PT1) [R2 + (PT2)(LT2) + (1‐PT2)(PT3)(LT3)].
Comparing the Research Options
We now have cost estimates for the three research options and the do nothing option.
These are:
Committing to the pre‐ and post‐market research options (“the pre & post research option”): R1
+ (1‐PT1) [R2 + (PT2)(LT2) + (1‐PT2)(PT3)(LT3)]
Committing to pre‐market research only (“the pre‐market‐only option” ): R1 + (1‐PT1)(PT3)(LT3)
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Committing to post‐market research only (“the post‐market‐only option”): R2 + (PT2)(LT2) + (1‐
PT2)(PT3)(LT3)
Doing nothing: (PT3)(LT3).
For the company, absent the possibility of incurring LT2 liability as a result of its own
testing and monitoring and the adverse effects they reveal, it would always be worthwhile to
engage in post‐market testing and monitoring if the condition is met that R2 + (1‐PT2)(PT3)(LT3) <
(PT3)(LT3). That universe of cases is represented by the left side of the diagram below. There is a
universe of cases for which the avoidance of possible LT2 liability makes it worthwhile to avoid
post‐market testing and instead do nothing, which meet the condition that R2 + (PT2)(LT2) + (1‐
PT2)(PT3)(LT3) > (PT3)(LT3). The right side of the diagram represent those cases. There is an
intersection area in the middle of the diagram consisting of cases that meet the two previous
conditions and for which it is also true that (PT2)(LT2) > (PT3)(LT3) ‐ ( R2 + (1‐PT2)(PT3)(LT3)). This is
the universe of cases for which liability avoidance will lead a company to avoid post‐market
testing and monitoring that they otherwise would have undertaken.

FIGURE TWO

Always Tests

Tests
With Liability
Protection

Never Tests

How big is this intersection area? The answer, of course, all depends on the values we
assign to the relevant variables. What we can say is that less testing or no testing may be a
liability‐minimizing option precisely in some cases when – on a social welfare basis – we would
ardently want such testing to happen. Testing would be most attractive from a social
perspective in those cases in which the testing would be highly effective at detecting any
adverse effects from the product, such testing would be inexpensive, and the damages
ultimately suffered by consumers and others would be huge if such testing does not occur and
the product remains on the market without proper warnings. As described below, the company
might well choose not to engage in testing in a subset of these cases – those in which the
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company perceives a very low perceived probability of detection of the product’s adverse
effects on the basis of independent, non‐company research.
The easiest way to see how liability‐minimization can deter testing is to imagine an
extreme case in which post‐market testing would be extremely effective at detecting any
adverse effects and would be extremely cheap to do. In such a case, there might be a 99
percent perceived probability that adverse effects (if there are any) would be detected by the
company in post‐market testing and such testing would cost almost nothing, perhaps a few
thousand dollars. It would be reasonable in such a case to round PT2 up to 1 and round R2 down
to 0. In terms of the intersection condition described above [(PT2)(LT2) > (PT3)(LT3) ‐ ( R2 + (1‐
PT2)(PT3)(LT3))], that would mean that (PT2)(LT2) now equals (LT2) and that (1‐PT2)(PT3)(LT3) becomes
zero. The company therefore will prefer doing nothing to engaging in highly effective, cheap
post‐market testing if the liability the company would expect to incur as a result of post‐market
testing (L2) would be more than the liability the company would expect to bear if it does not
test and keeps the product on the market without a warning ((PT3)(LT3)). The relevant question
then is, when would LT2 ever be greater than (PT3)(LT3)?
One answer (but not necessarily the only one) is where the damages that will be
incurred by consumers and others in Period Three are just enormous relative to the damages
incurred in Period Two but the independent probability of detection at T3 (PT3) verges on zero.
Where PT3 is of a similar magnitude to PT2, the possibility of a huge LT3 should make the company
decide to engage in post‐market testing. But it might be a liability‐minimizing strategy for the
company to avoid post‐market testing even when confronted with a relatively huge LT3 if PT3 is
very small. For example, imagine that LT2 is 3 million, LT3 is 400 million, and PT3 is just .007.
Recall that PT2 is effectively 1 and R2 is effectively zero. The expected costs for the company of
doing nothing and not engaging in post‐market testing would be (400,000,000)(.07) or $2.8
million, which is $200,000 less than LT2. In other words, doing nothing would save the company
$200,000 in expected liability in a case where post‐market testing could yield great social
benefits for minimal social costs.
D. Decreasing the Likelihood of Liability‐Driven Avoidance of Post‐Market

Testing

Let us assume that the scenario just described or similar ones is likely enough to warrant
attention. The question then is, how can any of the relevant variables be manipulated to make
it less likely that companies will avoid post‐market testing that they otherwise they might have
undertaken were it not for the threat of liability resulting from post‐market testing? In the
language of the previous discussion, that question boils down to, how can we make it more
likely that (LT3)(PT3) will be greater than (LT2)? There are essentially three possible manipulations
of the relevant variables – increasing PT3, increasing LT3, and decreasing LT2. The discussion that
follows focuses on decreasing LT2, which is the most realistic policy option.
PT3 – the independent detection variable ‐‐ is a key variable in terms of creating an
incentive for the company to engage in post‐market testing. Any increase in PT3 translates into
an in increase in the cost of doing nothing ‐‐ (PT3)(LT3) ‐‐ and makes it more likely that post‐
market testing will be a cheaper option than doing nothing. Any given increase in PT3, moreover,
also makes the pre‐and‐post‐testing option less expensive relative to all the other options.
Increasing PT3, therefore, might result in shifts not just from the do nothing option to post‐
market testing, but also shifts from just‐pre‐market testing or just‐post‐market testing to both
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pre‐and‐post market testing.33 That may be a good thing, at least from the vantage of the
precautionary study principle, which would seem to call for both pre‐ and post‐ market testing.
It is not obvious, however, that increasing PT3 is feasible. The best means of increasing
PT3 probably would be an increased expenditure in public research. As already discussed, there
has not been political support for substantial public funding to date. It is also not clear how
much of an expenditure in such research would be needed to lead to significant changes in
estimates of PT3. Moreover, as already discussed, there are probably inherent limitations in
public funding as a means to fill the product‐specific or category three information deficit, and
hence inherent limitations in the extent to which increases in public funding can boost PT3.
One possible way to increase LT3 and hence the cost of doing nothing would be to alter
the standard for liability applicable at time T3 and later. For example, if the standard of liability
at T2 and T3 initially were a middle‐of‐the road “should have known” standard (e.g. S=.5), then a
change to a genuine strict liability/hindsight standard at T3 and after would increase the
magnitude of LT3 relative to LT2 by 100 percent. That change, in turn, could be enough to make
post‐market testing a liability‐minimizing strategy when, before, doing nothing was the liability‐
minimizing strategy.
There is no tradition, however, of states and states common law imposing different
standards of liability depending on whether adverse effects were detected by company research
or were, instead, detected by independent, non‐company research. One could imagine a
federal law that purports to force the states to adopt a stricter standard of liability (genuine
strict liability that is) when the adverse effects were detected by independent, non‐company
research after the product had been on the market a long time and completed its market run
(T3). But there would be deep federalism, fairness, and chilling‐investment concerns about, and
strong political opposition to, any federal law that would require states to shift from a
negligence standard to a genuine strict liability standard.
As discussed below, there are plausible federal law changes that could result in the
reduction or elimination of LT2. A reduction or elimination in LT2 would reduce the
attractiveness of the do‐nothing option relative to the post‐market testing options. It thereby
would alleviate the problem of liability‐avoidance leading companies to forego post‐market
testing.
However, reducing or eliminating LT2 could have perverse effects. LT2 liability is a
component of the post‐market testing option but not a component of the pre‐market‐only
research option, so reducing LT2 will decrease the cost of the post‐market testing option
relative to the pre‐market testing option. Moreover, LT2 is a more heavily discounted
component of the pre‐and‐post market research option than it is of the only post‐market testing
option.34 As a result, any given reduction in LT2 translates into a bigger cost reduction for the
33

Assuming non zero probabilities of detection of adverse effects for both pre and post market testing
(that is, a non‐zero PT1 and a non‐zero PT2), the pre‐and–post approach is the strategy that minimizes the
possibility of the company ultimately bearing the cost represented by (PT3) (LT3). Any increase in PT3 and
hence (PT3)(LT3), therefore, increases the expected costs of the pre‐and‐post option the least, and thus
makes that option relatively less expensive than it previous was with respect to the other options.
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post market testing than it does for the pre‐and‐post research option, and hence decreases the
cost of the post‐market only testing option relative to the pre‐ and post‐research options.35
Table One summarizes the possible effects of the elimination of LT2 liability. As the
center column reflects, the elimination of LT2 liability may result in no change – the lowest cost‐
option before may be the same after. It is also possible that liability elimination would reduce
the costs of the post‐market‐only option and thus shift companies from doing nothing to post
market testing only. However, it is also the case that the reduction in the cost of the post‐
market‐only option may cause shifts from the pre‐market only option or the pre‐and‐post
option to the post‐market‐only research option.
TABLE ONE
POSSIBLE SHIFTS WITH LIABILITY PROTECTION
LOWEST – COST OPTION BEFORE
LIABILITY PROTECTION

POSSIBLE LOWEST ‐ COST OPTIONS
AFTER LIABILITY PROTECTION

POSSIBLE LOWEST‐ COST
OPTIONS AFTER CONDITIONAL
LIABILITY PROTECTION

DO ‐ NOTHING

DO ‐ NOTHING
POST‐MARKET ONLY
PRE & POST MARKET

DO – NOTHING
PRE & POST MARKET

PRE‐MARKET ONLY

PRE
POST
PRE & POST

PRE
PRE & POST

POST‐MARKET ONLY

POST‐MARKET ONLY

POST‐MARKET ONLY

PRE & POST MARKET

PRE & POST MARKET
POST‐MARKET ONLY

PRE & POST MARKET

From a public policy perspective, these two possible shifts – the shift form pre market‐
only research to post‐market‐only research and the shift from pre‐and‐post market research to
post‐market‐only research – are problematic. It is not always true that pre‐market testing is
preferable to post‐market testing, but pre‐market testing is essential because such testing, if it
does indeed detect harmful affects, can avoid putting any consumers of other human
34

LT2 is discounted by PT2 in the formula for the post‐market‐only option. LT2 is discounted by (1‐PT1)(P2)
in the formula for the pre‐and‐post research option.
35
For a similar argument developed in the context of proposals to immunize companies from penalties
from compliance violations discovered during internal audits, see David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives
of Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L .REV. 969, 982‐88 (1996).
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populations at risk. By definition, post‐market testing entails putting human beings at risk. And
(as already suggested) one certainly might not want to encourage shifts from a clearly higher‐
research‐investment, greater precaution option (pre‐and‐post testing) to a clearly lesser‐
research‐investment, lesser precaution option (post‐market‐only research).
These problematic shifts could be avoided by making LT2 liability relief contingent on the
company completing both pre‐ and post‐market research. The right‐hand column on Table One
shows the possible effects of such conditional liability relief. Conditioning liability relief on pre‐
as well as post‐market testing raises the cost of obtaining the relief for companies, and thus
presents a difficult tradeoff, from a policymaking perspective. On the one hand, conditioning
liability relief avoids the creation of an incentive for companies to abandon pre‐market research
they otherwise would have undertaken. On the one hand, conditioning liability relief may mean
that some companies that would have shifter away from a doing‐nothing approach will instead
continue to follow that approach and do nothing.
Which Products Will Be The Subject of Voluntary Testing
So far, we have spoken of a single nanotechnology product. However, a company may
have many products that contain nanotechnology and that might be candidates for a regime of
voluntary testing in return for liability relief. All else being equal, we might expect a company to
choose those products with the greatest possibility liability exposure ‐‐ those it expects to sell
the most or that it suspects may have some dangerous aspect ‐‐ for enrollment in the regime of
voluntary testing. In this way, the voluntary regime may focus attention to the products that
pose the greatest perceived risks to public health. Mandatory testing requirements could also
focus on such products, but in the context of the possible or planned imposition of mandatory
testing requirements, the company would not necessarily have an incentive to share with
regulators or the public its views (and the information behind its views) as to which products
pose to the greatest possible risks to the public and hence most warrant testing and monitoring.
Products Containing Identical or Substantially Identical Materials or Technology
In the previous discussion of choosing options, we have assumed that there is simply
one company making a decision regarding whether and how to invest in research regarding
possible adverse effects. For that reason, it was assumed that the only research that can
produce LT2 liability is the Period Two research of that single company. But there may be many
settings where several companies are producing substantially identical products, or more
specifically, products that contain substantially identical materials or technology that may pose
risks. For example, imagine two companies – company A and company B – that produce
sunscreens containing precisely or virtually the same kind of nanomaterials in the same
configuration. Pre‐ or post‐ market testing by company A could have an effect on company B
whether or not company B chooses to engage in its own research. If company A detects harm
as a result of its post‐market research and recalls the product (or adds a warning), regulatory,
market, and liability pressure may well force company B to take parallel action with respect to
its product.
Let us first consider the case where there is no liability (LT2) relief for a company that
voluntarily tests its product and pulls the product if harm is detected. In that sort of regime,
company B has a free‐riding‐related incentive not to engage in post‐market research regarding

27

its product. If company A finds that the product is harmful in post‐market testing and both
company A and company B therefore must pull their products from the market, company B is
(all else being equal) better off than if it had undertaken the safety research: both company A
and B will bear costs in terms of lost sales and perhaps liability awards, but at least company B
will have avoided R2, the direct costs of research.
Now consider the case where liability relief is available for any company that conducts
post‐market testing (in our model, Period Two testing) and finds harmful effects and removes
the product from the marketplace. Any incentive company B might have had to free ride on
company A’s research now would be countered ‐‐ and perhaps more than offset ‐‐ by its
incentive to obtain liability relief by engaging in testing. It might well be economically rational,
therefore, for company B to agree to participate in a research‐for‐liability‐relief program if
company A has already agreed to participate and thus increased the likelihood of detection of
harmful effects, but refuse to participate if company A has already refused to participate.
Another possible incentive for company B to agree to participate in a program after Company A
has already agreed is that there might be savings from pooling research funds or merging
research efforts with Company A. Table Two summarizes Company A and B choices under the
current and under a new, liability relief regime.

TABLE TWO

Follow the Leader in a Voluntary
Testing Regime
Current
Regime:
Company
A Tests
Company
A and B
both liable
New
Regime:
Company
A Tests
Only
Company
B liable

Current
Regime:
Company
A Doesn’t
Test
Neither
liable
New
Regime:
Company
A Doesn’t
Test
Neither
Liable

One implication of this analysis is that securing the initial participants in any research‐
for‐liability‐relief program is particularly important for – and may be particularly challenging –
for any such program. The first participant does not have as strong an incentive to join, all else
being equal, as the second or third participant. In order to give all potential participants equally
strong incentives to participate, the extent of liability arguably should be tiered, with greater
relief going to early‐to‐agree companies and lesser relief to the later‐to‐agree companies.
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Producers of Products Containing The Same General Category of Potentially Risky
Materials or Technology
Large clusters of products may contain similar materials or technologies, and research
regarding one or more of these products thus might help inform and focus research regarding
the other programs in the cluster. For example, drug A may alter mood disorders through the
same theorized chemistry as drug B but may have different active ingredients. The discovery of
a correlation between use of Drug A and heart attacks would not prove that such a correlation
exists between use of Drug B and heart attacks, but the discovery almost certainly would
provide an impetus to study heart health within the pool of people using Drug B. In the
nanotechnology context, we believe that the same basic type of nanotechnology may behave
differently in different product formulations. But research regarding any nanotechnology
product may shed some light on nanotechnology generally and hence all nanotechnology
products, and certainly research on any nanotechnology product containing a particular element
(such as silver or carbon) may shed some light on the range of nanotechnology products
containing that element.
In terms of the model above, one way to understand the effect of some company’s
research on others is in terms of the variable PT3, the probability that a product will be
established as having harmful effects as a result of non‐company research once the product has
finished its market run (T3). We can imagine a company A and a company B that produce the
same general category of nanotechnology. The research completed by company A, if made
public, would add to the body of scientific evidence and understanding and, in that sense, would
be equivalent to additional academic or public research. That additional contribution to public
knowledge would presumably increase (if minimally) the likelihood that any adverse effects
from company B’s product will be identified by the time that product has finished its market run
at T3. Company A’s additional contribution to public knowledge, in other words, would boost
company B’s estimate of PT3 and hence boost the expected cost of the doing nothing option. If
we imagine not just one company engaging in research but 100 companies engaging in research,
we can imagine that that research would significantly boost company #101’s estimate of PT3 that
that company will use in choosing whether to continue to do nothing or instead commence
research and follow the lead of companies #1‐100.
One possible implication of this analysis, like the analysis regarding substantially
identical products, is that broad voluntary engagement in research efforts within an industry
could itself result in more, even broader engagement in research in the industry – at least if the
results of all the research were accessible to the public. If the goal is to significantly increase
voluntary research regarding products that contain a general category of technology that is
poorly understood and potentially risky, an important hurdle is to secure a research
commitment from a good number of the companies in the industry. Special incentives for early
committers can produce the dividend of voluntary engagement in research by companies that
will then follow suit in part because of their perception that the research that will be produced
by the early committers, on net, will increase the likelihood that adverse effects could one day
be tied to their products.
IV FDA PREEMPTION AS A MODEL FOR FASHIONING A VOLUNTARY‐TESTING‐FOR‐
LIABILITY‐RELIEF REGIME FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY
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Liability relief as a quid pro quo for voluntary testing is a policy or legal reform that
could, in theory, be adopted at the state, federal or international level. Because at least initial
state or international adoption seems less likely than federal adoption, this Part focuses upon
how such a federal regime could and should be structured. But first, it is worth explaining the
difficulties with a state‐based or international approach.
The basic political economy of state legislatures and courts would work against the
adoption of any liability relief reform in the context of nanotechnology products. State courts,
applying existing state common law, perhaps could reduce liability for companies that engage in
voluntary pre‐ and post‐market testing of products. More readily, state legislatures could adopt
such liability relief by statute. But states are unlikely to adopt such measures and, even if they
did, are not well‐equipped to ensure that the appropriate kind of testing and monitoring
actually was undertaken. For an individual state, a reduction in liability means (presumably) a
reduction in resources available to its injured citizens. Liability relief is thus an in‐state cost.
The manufacturers (and perhaps even distributors) of nanotechnology products sold or
consumed within a state in many cases would be based outside the state and indeed might be
based outside the United States altogether. And there is likely to be skepticism that liability
relief in any particular state would lead to significantly more testing of the products developed
and manufactured in that state, given that those products presumably would be marketed not
just in that state but throughout the country an perhaps the world.
Even if states were open to adopting liability relief, they would not be well‐positioned to
implement it. States do not have the staff and other resources to oversee pre‐ and post‐market
voluntary testing and monitoring (let alone to undertake such testing with company funds).
There are no state drug agencies akin to the FDA; there is no state institute of health
comparable to NIH. The building blocks for meaningful oversight and administration are found
at the federal, not state, level. And knowing that, even state officials and politicians who see the
case for liability relief are likely to look to the federal government for any liability reforms tied to
oversight of testing.
At the international level, any proposed legal reform confronts the basic limitations is
the deep difficulty of bridging national differences and sovereignty concerns to form binding and
enforceable accords. Tort liability, in particular, has long been regarded as a domestic/national
prerogative, and is not the subject of even significant “soft” international law. There are also no
international oversight agencies as such akin to the FDA. One might imagine international
coordination once the US, Japan and the EU adopted some kind of liability program, but action
at the nation state level almost certainly would have to come first.36

36

Another consideration of institutional design is how a regime of voluntary testing for US. liability relief
would dovetail with international law. Under the WTO’s evolving jurisprudence, a US statute providing
liability relief in return for testing probably would pass muster as long as the stated purpose of
encouraging testing would be the protection of US consumers and others from effects realized in the
United States from the use and disposal of imported products , as opposed to protection of foreign
workers and others from adverse effects from the manufacture of the products outside the United States.
There might, therefore, be some limits on the testing that could be asked of foreign companies vis‐à‐vis
worker exposures and safety. [CITES]
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It would thus seem that any liability relief‐for‐testing regime would have to be, vis‐à‐vis
and within the United States, a federal regime established by federal statute. Tort liability is, of
course, a traditional domain of the states. Congress has interfered with state prerogatives vis‐à‐
vis tort, despite federalism concerns, in two situations. The first is where some good or activity
deemed essential to national welfare is arguably not being produced or might not be produced
because of liability threats (such as nuclear power, certain types of aircraft). The second is
where a through regime of mandatory federal testing administered by and approval given by the
FDA has (arguably) ensured that a product reflects a considered federal judgment as to the
balance of benefits and costs. An implicit rationale for FDA preemption may be that if
companies are to be willing to take on the costs and the burdens of a thorough approval
process, including testing, they need to or at least should be able to set aside concerns about
state tort liability that might require even more testing, even more limits on releases of product,
and even more product warnings. Liability relief from state tort law for voluntary testing of
nanotechnology products under federal oversight would be similar to liability relief from state
tort law for mandatory testing and approval by the FDA: in both cases, testing with oversight
would translate into some reduction in liability
.
FDA preemption of common law tort law, however, has been and remains extremely
controversial. A regime of liability relief for voluntary testing of nanotechnology products,
depending on the design of the regime, could be subject to the same kinds of objections. To be
tenable and succeed, therefore, a liability relief for voluntary testing and monitoring regime
should have the component discussed in the following sub‐Parts.
Genuine Statutory (Rather Than Agency) Preemption
One of the most controversial aspects of FDA preemption of state tort actions is that
federal statutes, in plain language, do not clearly call for such preemption of tort actions at all.
As a result, commentators – as well as some of the Justices – have criticized FDA preemption of
common law suits as a joint creation of the courts and federal bureaucrats, instead of
Congress.37
Preemption doctrine makes Congressional intent the touchstone of when state law,
including common law, is preempted. This is appropriate because, in a federal system where
state prerogatives necessitate respect, preemption should be regarded as an exceptional or
unusual action and hence one that has courts should recognize only with clear direction from
the only federal branch of government explicitly authorized to make federal law, Congress.
Thus, to be fully legitimate, any regime of voluntary testing for liability must be built on specific
language in federal statutes providing when and to what extent state common law claims are
preempted.
Preemption Limited To Torts Based on Failures to Test or Monitor

37

For example, Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court’s finding of preemption of state common law suits
under the Medical Device Act (MDA) as “not mandated by Congress” and “at odds with the MDA’s central
purpose: to protect consumer safety.”
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Another source of controversy regarding FDA preemption of state tort case has been
that it has been extended (or industry has sought to extend it, but not yet succeeded, as in
Wyeth v Levine) to risk or dangers of which the manufacturer/defendant allegedly had clear
knowledge. Defendants have argued, with some success, that they were not required to warn
of risks they comprehended as long as the warning they did issue had been approved by FDA.
Critics of preemption in this context argue that federal regulators sometimes do not understand
or receive the necessary data or are unduly pressured to accept incomplete warning. To the
extent this is so, federal preemption rewards companies for sitting on “bad” formation and
knowingly endangering the public without warning.
These same concerns all counsel in favor of circumscribing tort preemption as a quid
pro quo for voluntary testing and monitoring to state tort claims predicated on allegations that
the manufacturer failed to conduct adequate testing or monitoring and hence did not
apprehend the risk from its products and make decisions based on knowledge of those risks.
Companies that sat on "bad information," failed to disclose it as required, or misled the relevant
agencies or public in the disclosure that was made would not be rewarded with liability relief.
(If relief took the form of insurance premium subsidies, see infra, those subsidies could be
recovered by the government if company misconduct later came to light.) Moreover, because a
voluntary regime would not mandate any particular labels or warning labels for products,
companies could not argue that they had every reason to think they need not have or should
not have included any warning based on "bad information" in addition to those required by
federal regulators.
Government Oversight and Transparency
In the FDA drug and device approval context, there have been strong claims made that
there has been too little vigorous agency oversight of private research, and too little
transparency, and hence too little oversight by the general public of failures of regulators.38 The
litany of charges includes that large companies pressure scientists to reach favorable results;
scientists fail to disclose all conflicts or private finding sources; there is an inadequate
accounting by regulators and lack of public information regarding studies that are abandoned,
suspended or left open indefinitely because preliminary results would not be helpful to the
sponsoring company; and the public lack access to the data in studies submitted to regulators.
Inadequate funding of FDA and other oversight bodies is another theme of the critics. Along
with the criticisms have come many proposals, including: more government research with public
funding, a public registry for all initiated studies with updates, public access to the data
supporting or underlying private study results relied upon by regulators, and thorough
disclosure of conflicts requirements for scientists and so on.39
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Two powerful indictments of regulatory oversights are DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW
INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE COMPANIES:
HOW THYE DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
39

Two excellent sources regarding criticisms of the current regime and reform proposals are Thomas O.
McGarity & Wendy Wagner, BENDING SCIENCE (2008), especially chapters 10‐12; and Wendy Wagner &
Rena Steinzor, eds., RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS (2006), especially pp. 281‐298.
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All of the concerns about oversight and public access and all the possible reforms that
have been invoked vis‐à‐vis the FDA mandatory approval process would have relevance to a
voluntary regime of testing and monitoring as a quid pro quo for liability relief. These oversight
and transparency concerns would need to be addressed for a voluntary regime to gain
widespread legitimacy. One particularly thorny issue concerns confidential business
information: nanotechnology product developers and producers have and probably will
continue to insist that such information is embedded in much of their testing data and reports,
and that such data and reports therefore cannot be disclosed to the public. Specific guidelines
and review mechanisms, however, must be used to ensure that “confidential business
information” is not invoked expansively to curtail all meaningful public access. Even with
respect to core confidential business information, there must be creative means to ensure the
substance of public accountability, such as release of detailed summaries by regulators and
designated NGO (or other designated third‐party inspectors) access to and review of the data.
Subsidized Insurance as an Alternative Liability‐ Relief Mechanism
FDA preemption ‐‐ or any tort preemption ‐‐ is also controversial because it can leave
some injured persons without any compensation. One of the essential roles of the tort law is
compensation, after all. The same concern would apply to injured persons whose suits would
be preempted or partially preempted by any nanotechnology liability relief regime based on
voluntary testing. One can of course argue that a regime of liability relief does not necessarily
result in anyone being denied compensation because, in the absence of liability relief,
companies might not have tested their products and the information regarding adverse effects
would not have come to light. However, in any particular case, it will be impossible to know
whether the information regarding adverse effects and their causes would have come to light
even in the absence of the promise of liability relief. Moreover, from the ex post perspective of
an injured person and his family, what truly matters is not ex ante incentives and considerations
of institutional design but just the current moment and whether compensation is available now
for very real injuries.
From the perspective of honoring the compensation mission of the tort system, the best
way to provide liability relief would not be limits on liability per se but rather subsidies for
liability insurance. The federal government already provides or subsidizes insurance directly or
re‐insurance guarantees in some contexts,40 and could also subsidize part of the cost of private
insurance premiums for companies that opt into a pre‐ and post‐market testing regime for
nanotechnology products. Insurance subsidies could be as powerful an incentive for
companies as direct liability relief, while avoiding the problem of the uncompensated injured.
And insurance subsidies could be combined with partial tort preemption in a blended regime
that would mean reduced, but not eliminated, compensation for injured persons.
There are, however, several problems with an insurance subsidy approach. First, there
is a significant history of (in the view of many) industry capture of government insurance or
40

See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107‐297, 106 Stat. 2322 (requiring insurers not to
exclude terrorism‐related claims and providing for the government to act as an excess insurer of
terrorism‐related claims); Price ‐Anderson Act, 42 USC § 2210, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (requiring nuclear power provider to carry an insurance and providing for federal payment of
insurance claims in excess of the private insurance mandated by the statute).
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insurance subsidy programs. Second, government insurance subsidies are, like direct funding of
research, a government expenditure that must compete with a great many other possible clams
on government resources. It is true, however, that the magnitude of insurance subsidies may be
hard to calculate and they are partly to be paid, if at all, in the future, so they are not
particularly visible in the budgeting process. But that opaqueness, while making them more
politically viable, also makes insurance subsidies more susceptible to interest group
manipulation.
The value of insurance subsidies as a means to incentivize participation in a testing
regime would be enhanced if the subsidies were tied to a requirement that all producers of
nanotechnology products carry adequate liability insurance that does not exclude
nanotechnology‐related claims.41 With a mandatory insurance requirement, small start up
companies that might be somewhat insensitive to long‐term liability risks would have an
incentive to test generally to keep private insurance premiums down (to the extent insurers
would give them credit for testing) and an incentive to test products so as to qualify for
government insurance subsidies.42 Indeed, the availability of subsidies might help counter
arguments by such companies that they lack the cash for testing and insurance and therefore
will be driven out of business if additional costs are foisted upon them.
It is true, nonetheless, that the liability relief regime outlined here might be of greater
advantage to larger, more‐liability‐sensitive and perhaps better‐funded companies than small
start‐ups with potentially limited lives as legal entities. It is also true that the adoption of
mandatory insurance requirements with liability relief or subsidies for voluntary testing might
change the patterns of organization among producers of nanotechnology products. We might
observe fewer stand‐alone start ups and more collaborations and (in terms of product
development) earlier collaborations between start‐ups and larger companies. But such a shift in
industries that produce nanotechnology products might be a good thing, reflecting the fact that
the production and marketing of potentially very risky products (as with FDA approved
prescription drugs) may require the extensive participation, if not dominance, of relatively large
corporate entities.
Features Unique to a Voluntary Regime
As the discussion in Part [ ] suggests, the goal of obtaining significant participation by
industry makes it essential that there be some early participants who can in effect draw in later
participants. Greater liability relief could be offered to early participants as an inducement,
perhaps in the form of greater insurance subsidies than those that would be made available to
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See Robin Wilson, Nanotechnology: The Challenge of Regulating Known Unknowns, 34 J. L., MED. AND
ETHICS 704, 711 (2006) (advocating that nanotechnology developers who receive federal funds be required
to carry commercial liability insurance); Maksim Rakhlin, Regulating Nanotechnology: A private‐Public
Insurance Solution, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. (2008) (iBrief), available at (advocating mandatory insurance
coverage for nanotechnology producers with government guarantees of liabilities over coverage caps,
modeled after the insurance regime for nuclear power producers under the Price‐Anderson Act and the
Energy Policy Act of 2005).
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Compare Davies, supra note 1, at 22 ("A major disadvantage of voluntary programs is that they may
leave out the people who most need to be included. In the case of NT, small firms making risky products
and large firms with small consciences are not likely to volunteer to do health testing or to give EPA
information that might indicate significant risk.").
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later participants. Another inducement for early participants might be their ability to advertise
to consumers and others that they have opted into and met the guidelines of a safety regime,
whereas (if that were true) their competitors had not yet done so. As Wendy Wagner has
suggested (although not in the nanotechnology context), legal authorization and protection for
companies to make such claims might offer enough of a competitive advantage to encourage
testing that they otherwise might have been foregone.43 Whether companies would regard the
ability to make such claims as advantageous is unknown, but if they do, that ability, coupled
with special liability relief incentives based on early entry into the voluntary testing regime,
might be enough to energize an initial round of participation that could set the ground for broad
industry participation.

V. CONCLUSION: NANOTECHNOLOGY AND BEYOND
This Article offers a model of why nanotechnology companies might forego safety testing and
monitoring in order to avoid liability, and suggests a regime of liability relief as a quid pro quo for
voluntary pre‐and post‐market testing and monitoring. Nanotechnology products fit the
conceptual space where such a voluntary regime might be helpful ‐‐ a space in which the
company developing the product rationally may foresee some liability risk in the absence of
company research into environmental, health and safety effects but also rationally may perceive
that such research itself could create liability that the company otherwise would have avoided
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See Wendy E. Wagner, Using Competition‐Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L. J.
629, 631 (2008). In the realm of consumer products realm of the nanotechnology product market,
making such a claim could have offer substantial competitive advantage as a practical matter if it were
accompanied by an effective labeling regime that required all products containing nanotechnology to
contain some kind of statement of that fact. However, if that were done, Wagner's' point might be even
more applicable in the nanotechnology context than in the context of industrial chemicals that are the
focus of TSCA, because the primary consumers of such chemicals are businesses rather than retail,
individual consumers.
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